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INTRODUCTION 
In January 2015 two armed gunman stormed the offices of Charlie 
Hebdo, a satirical magazine that frequently featured cartoons of the Prophet 
Muhammad.1 In the wake of the attack almost two million protestors took 
to the streets waving pencils in a show of support for free expression.2 But, 
simultaneously, French authorities cracked down on hate speech3—in the 
week following the attacks alone fifty-four people were arrested for 
violating hate speech laws.4 Over fifty organizations responded with an 
open letter condemning increased restrictions on free expression and 
declaring that “[u]nder international law, the right to freedom of expression 
also protects speech that some may find shocking, offensive or 
disturbing.”5 Debate about the relationship between the right to freedom of 
expression and the right to freedom from incitement to racial 
discrimination is only increasing in the wake of similar attacks in 
Copenhagen, Denmark6 and Garland, Texas.7 
The tension between these two rights illustrates a problem that goes to 
the foundation of international human rights law. Human rights are 
universal—they are “for all persons in all societies.”8 Although a variety of 
objections have been put to that proposition,9 it remains a normative pillar 
of the international human rights movement. The universality of human 
rights suggests that every individual is entitled to every human right by 
virtue of his or her personhood. Accordingly, a state should, as a 
conceptual matter, be able to assure all individuals every human right 
 
 1.  Charlotte Alfred, France in Shock After Brutal Attack on Satirical Newspaper Charlie Hebdo, 
WORLD POST (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/07/charlie-hebdo-attack_n_64290 
58.html. 
 2.  Liz Alderman, Huge Show of Solidarity in Paris Against Terrorism, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 
11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/world/europe/paris-march-against-terror-charlie-heb 
do.html?_r=1. 
 3.  French Comedian Dieudonne to Stand Trial Over Facebook Post on Paris Attacks, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/14/dieudonne-trial-charlie-
hebdo_n_6472480.html. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Not in Our Name: World Press Freedom Day 116 Days After Charlie Hebdo, GUARDIAN 
(May 1, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/may/01/not-in-our-name-world-press-free 
dom-day-116-days-after-charlie-hebdo. 
 6.   Deadly Shooting at Copenhagen Free Speech Event, WORLD POST (Feb. 14, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/14/copenhagen-shooting_n_6683792.html. 
 7.  William J. Gorta, ‘Draw Muhammad’ Contest Shooting: Two Suspects Dead, Guard Shot in 
Texas, NBC NEWS (May 4, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/shooting-outside-draw-
muhammad-contest-texas-n352996. 
 8.  Louis Henkin, International Human Rights as “Rights,” 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 425, 433 (1979). 
 9.  See, e.g., R.J. VINCENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 37–38 (1986) 
(describing cultural relativism). 
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without compromising any other. Indeed, it would be antithetical to 
universality if states were forced to secure selective protections because of 
two rights’ mutually exclusive content. 
Yet, the potential for a “rights-clash” is often glaring, as in the case of 
the right to freedom of expression and the right to freedom from incitement 
to racial discrimination. Both rights are secured by treaties.10 And while the 
two are not necessarily mutually exclusive, the potential for incompatibility 
is clear. Take, for example, the Charlie Hebdo cover depicting the Prophet 
Muhammad and promising “100 lashes if you don’t die of laughter!”11 
Because the cover implicitly villainizes Shari’a law it arguably conflicts 
with the right of Muslim individuals to live free from incitement to racial 
discrimination. If, however, this statement is protected expression, it would 
seem impossible for a state to both protect Muslim individuals from 
incitement and, simultaneously, vouchsafe the right to free speech. 
Scholars have pointed to such conflicts between human rights as a 
threat to the entrenched vision of “basic rights as forming a stable system 
made up of mutually compatible elements.”12 Some have even voiced 
concern that such conflicts are intractable.13  But others have pointed out 
that incompatibility is avoidable—it is a matter of interpretation.14 There 
are a variety of interpretive mechanisms international courts and treaty 
bodies can employ to avoid or mitigate such conflicts. Statements inciting 
racial discrimination may be deemed to fall outside the scope of the 
freedom of expression. In Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, for example, the 
European Court of Human Rights held that pamphlets inciting ethnic hatred 
toward Jewish people were not protected by the freedom of expression 
because of their hateful content.15 Alternatively, the two rights could be 
reconciled using a proportionality balancing analysis. A court employing a 
proportionality balancing analysis would, on a case-by-case basis, weigh 
the interest in freedom of expression against the interest in freedom from 
 
 10.  See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 231 [hereinafter ECHR] (securing the right to 
freedom of expression); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965) [hereinafter ICERD] 
(securing the right to freedom from discrimination). 
 11.  Miriam Krule, Charlie Hebdo’s Most Controversial Religious Covers, Explained, SLATE (Jan. 
7, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/2015/01/07/charlie_hebdo_covers_religious_satire_car 
toons_translated_and_explained.html. 
 12.  REX MARTIN, RAWLS AND RIGHTS 129 (1985). 
 13.  Xiaobing Xu & George Wilson, On Conflict of Human Rights, 5 PIERCE L. REV., 31, 33–34 
(2007) (discussing, but not adopting, this position). 
 14.  See generally id. (exploring various techniques for reconciling human rights conflicts). 
 15.  See generally Cannie & Vorhoof, infra note 190, at 62 (discussing Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, 
App. No. 35222/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007)). 
3. SHOWALTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2016  2:31 PM 
380 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol 26:377 
incitement to racial discrimination.  Each of these approaches would enable 
states to ratify instruments protecting both rights without fear of an 
irreconcilable conflict. More broadly, these interpretative methodologies 
would provide a normatively more desirable reconciliation of competing 
human rights. Reconciliation is not only more consistent with universality; 
it would also facilitate the simultaneous protection of a greater variety of 
human rights. 
If international judicial bodies do indeed employ such strategies, one 
would expect to observe a trend toward greater legal consistency or even 
convergence over time, as courts and treaty bodies review a growing array 
of situations and rights clashes in different treaties. This Note tests whether 
such convergence has in fact emerged using racist speech as a case study.  
It focuses on three treaty provisions. The first two provisions protect the 
potentially conflicting rights at hand. Article 10 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“ECHR”) secures the right to freedom of expression.16 Article 4 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (“ICERD”) secures the freedom from incitement to 
discrimination based on race, nationality, or ethnicity.17 The third relevant 
provision, Article 17 of the ECHR, forbids interpreting any right in the 
ECHR as implying a right to limit or destroy any other ECHR guarantee.18 
Examining the interaction between ECHR Article 10 and ICERD 
Article 4 is particularly salient because eighteen states in Europe19 have 
ratified both ICERD and the ECHR. The potential difficulties for these dual 
ratification countries are exemplified by Jersild v. Denmark, in which the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that Denmark’s attempt to 
comply with ICERD Article 4 resulted in a violation of ECHR Article 10.20  
The rights clash in Jersild is illustrative of a wider set of treaty conflicts 
that arise whenever a state is required to protect both freedom of expression 
and freedom from incitement to racial discrimination.21 
 
 16.  ECHR, supra note 10, art. 10. 
 17.  ICERD, supra note 10, art. 4. 
 18.  ECHR, supra note 10, art. 17. 
 19.  As of March 27, 2015, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Croatia; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; 
Germany; Greece; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova; Montenegro; Netherlands; Portugal; Serbia; Slovakia; 
Slovenia; Macedonia; and Ukraine have all ratified both ICERD and the ECHR. 
 20.  See discussion infra Section III. 
 21.  There is, for example, potential for a clash between ICERD Article 4 and Article 13 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, which protects a “freedom of thought and expression” that 
includes the “freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s 
choice.” Organization of American States [OAS], American Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 
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This study finds that the ECtHR did, temporarily, use its interpretation 
of Article 17 to bring its application of Article 10 in line with the ICERD 
Committee’s reading of Article 4. After Jersild was decided, the ECtHR 
began applying Article 17 to place racist hate speech outside the freedom 
of expression’s protections.22 That interpretation made the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of Article 10 consistent with the ICERD Committee’s 
position that states must categorically prohibit racist speech not-
withstanding the right to free expression.23 And once the ECtHR made that 
change, the ICERD Committee began relaxing its approach to 
accommodate free expression.24 
But the case study does not bear out a linear progression toward 
convergence. Once the ICERD Committee relaxed its position, the ECtHR 
once again began taking a hardline approach to free expression.25 And, 
after the ECtHR did so, the ICERD Committee returned to its early, 
categorical stance.26 In light of these developments dual signatories now 
face the same problems that Denmark confronted in Jersild. 
This Note explores that puzzling competition, which exists alongside, 
but also in tension with, the use of interpretation to avoid a “rights-clash.” 
Specifically, it argues that the shift resulted because the ICERD Committee 
and ECtHR did not approach the human rights at issue as part of an 
integrated set of universal protections. Instead, both bodies vied to abandon 
more accommodating positions once the conflict “abated” because they 
viewed interpretive compromises as temporary fixes—fixes that stood in 
the way of maximally protecting each tribunal’s preferred interpretation of 
the right. This Note argues, in light of the recent return to a jurisprudential 
impasse, that truly maximizing human rights protections requires 
approaching interpretive compromises as a desirable solution. Specifically, 
it argues that the ICERD Committee and the ECtHR should adopt a 
proportionality balancing analysis that recognizes the protection of 
potentially conflicting rights as a legitimate aim with the potential to justify 
restricting the primary right at issue.  This balancing approach would 
 
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.  ICERD Article 4 also presents the potential for 
conflict with the protection provided for free expression under Article 9 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 
58 (1982), 27 REV. INT’L COMMISSION JURISTS 76 (1981).  
 22.  See infra Section III.B.1. 
 23.  See infra Section III.A. 
 24.  See infra Section III.A. 
 25.  See infra Section III.B.2.C. 
 26.  See infra Section III.B.2.C. 
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reflect a more circumspect view of what it means to protect human rights—
one that meaningfully credits universality. 
Before exploring these issues, however, this Note addresses several 
important threshold matters. First, Section I describes the evolutive 
approach to treaty interpretation employed by the ECtHR and the ICERD 
Committee. This is critical because if the meaning of either treaty were 
static, tracking their interpretation over time in search of convergence 
would be futile. Next, Section II establishes that the text of both Article 4 
of ICERD and Article 10 of the ECHR leave room compatibility with the 
other. Section III tracks the interpretation of both provisions. Notably, 
Section III(A), which discusses ICERD, makes a novel contribution to the 
literature on hate speech—it is the first comprehensive survey of the 
ICERD Committee’s Article 4 jurisprudence. Section IV examines the 
interpretation of the two provisions in conjunction, documenting and 
analyzing the temporary move toward consistency and subsequent return to 
conflict described above. Finally, Section V concludes. 
I. THE EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 
According to the evolutionary approach to treaty interpretation, the 
meaning of treaty text is not static; rather, it changes with time.27 The ICJ 
elaborated on the nature of and justifications for evolutive interpretation in 
Navigational and Related Rights.28 There the ICJ emphasized that the focus 
on the parties’ intent does not “signify that, where a term’s meaning is no 
longer the same as it was at the date of conclusion, no account should ever 
be taken of its meaning at the time when the treaty is to be interpreted for 
purposes of applying it.”29 
Rather, there are two situations in which the meaning of treaty text is 
relevant to the parties’ intent and, thereby, to interpretation. First, under 
Article 31(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(“VCLT”),30 subsequent practice may embody the parties’ tacit agreement 
to depart from original meaning.31 Second, the parties may have intended 
the meaning of a treaty’s terms to evolve at its conclusion “so as to make 
 
 27.  See generally EIRIK BJORGE, THE EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES (2014) 
(endorsing and analyzing the evolutionary approach to interpreting treaties). 
 28.  Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment, 2009 
I.C.J. 213, ¶¶ 63–64 (July 13) [hereinafter Navigational Rights]. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 31.  Navigational Rights, 2009 I.C.J. ¶ 64. 
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allowance for, among other things, developments in international law.”32 
Since the ICJ’s decision in Navigational Rights, the evolutive approach has 
become a well-established mode of interpretation. 
Both the court and treaty body at the heart of this case study apply the 
evolutionary approach to interpreting the human rights treaties examined 
herein. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(“ICERD Committee”) employs the evolutionary approach when 
interpreting ICERD. In Hagan v. Australia the Committee stated that “the 
Convention, as a living instrument, must be interpreted and applied taking 
into [account] the circumstances of contemporary society.”33 Accordingly, 
the Committee expressed that “its duty” in Hagan was to analyze the use of 
the term “nigger” in light of modern sensitivities, regardless of evidence 
that, “as a nickname probably with reference to a shoeshine brand, [the 
term] was not designed to demean or diminish its bearer, Mr. Brown, who 
was neither black nor of aboriginal descent.”34 
Similarly, the ECtHR has long applied an evolutionary approach when 
interpreting the ECHR.35 In Tyrer v. The United Kingdom the Court stated 
that it “must also recall that the Convention is a living instrument which, as 
the Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light of present-
day conditions.”36 The Court has continued to apply the evolutionary 
approach in cases including Dudgeon v. United Kingdom.37 In Dudgeon the 
Court assessed whether a law prohibiting intimate homosexual relations 
violated the right to private life guaranteed by Article 8.38 Notably, the 
Court did so in light of “the marked changes which have occurred in . . . the 
domestic law of the member States.”39 The Court reasoned that the law did 
violate Article 8, emphasizing that “[a]s compared with the era when that 
legislation was enacted, there is now . . . an increased tolerance, of 
homosexual behaviour.”40 The fact that the evolutive approach is not only 
consistent with the VCLT, but employed by both the ECtHR and the 
ICERD Committee confirms that the meanings of ICERD and the ECHR 
are not static. Therefore, convergence is possible and proceeding to 
 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Hagan v. Australia, U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 62d 
Sess., ¶ 7.3, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 (Mar. 20, 2003). 
 34.  Id. ¶ 7.2, 7.3. 
 35.  ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 328–33 
(2010). 
 36.  Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, ¶ 31, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978). 
 37.  Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, at 23, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981). 
 38.  Id. ¶ 34. 
 39.  Id. ¶ 60. 
 40.  Id. 
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examine the decisions of these bodies for converging interpretations of the 
provisions at issue is appropriate. 
However, there is a well-recognized limit on evolutionary 
interpretation: the meaning of a treaty cannot evolve to contradict its text.41 
For example, if a treaty stated: “Freedom of expression does not protect 
racist statements,” it could not42 be interpreted as providing such 
protection, no matter how appropriate doing so may seem in light of 
modern circumstances. Accordingly, it is necessary to conduct a textual 
analysis of both ICERD Article 4 and ECHR Article 10 to determine 
whether their respective texts permit international judges and treaty body 
members to interpret the two provisions consistently. As Section II 
illustrates, they do. 
II. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS: ROOM FOR CONSISTENCY 
A. ICERD Article 4: The Freedom From Incitement to Racial  
Discrimination 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”) is the most comprehensive international 
instrument condemning racial discrimination.43 ICERD defines 
discrimination broadly, prohibiting any “distinction, exclusion, restriction 
or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin 
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing” the equal 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise of “human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of 
public life.”44 Thus, the text frames the freedom from discrimination as a 
threshold condition for the enjoyment of every other human right. 
Article 4 is at the heart of ICERD. Article 4 not only contains several 
negative obligations,45 but also requires that States take detailed positive 
 
 41.  See BATES, supra note 35, at 328–30 (explaining that in interpreting a treaty, one must keep 
in mind the treaty’s object, purpose, principles, and context at the time it was made). 
 42.  However, the Court has indicated that this may not hold in all circumstances. For example, in 
Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, the Court revisited, in dicta, its holding in Soering v. 
United Kingdom. Al-Saadoon & Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 61498/08, at 51‒61, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2010). The Court in Al-Saadoon suggested that the wide ratification of Article 6 could be read as 
a de facto modification of Article 2, which states that capital punishment is permitted in certain, narrow 
circumstances. Id. 
 43.  Onder Bakircioglu, Freedom of Expression and Hate Speech, 16 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 
1, 27 (2008). 
 44.  ICERD, supra note 10, art. 1(1). 
 45.  These include the obligation to “condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are 
based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, 
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measures to eradicate and prevent racial discrimination.46 Under Article 
4(a), States are required to declare punishable by law: (i) dissemination of 
ideas based on racial superiority; (ii) dissemination of ideas based on racial 
hatred; (iii) incitement to racial discrimination; (iv) acts of racial violence; 
(v) incitement to acts of racial violence; and, finally,  (vi) assisting racist 
activities financially or otherwise.47 Additionally, Article 4(b) requires that 
States declare the existence of organizations and propaganda activities that 
promote and incite racial discrimination illegal and punish participation in 
such organizations and activities.48 
But ICERD contains a limit on the positive measures a state may be 
required to enact that makes compatibility with free speech possible. 
ICERD states that positive measures to eradicate incitement to or acts of 
discrimination must be undertaken “with due regard to the principles 
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights 
expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention.”49 This clause indicates 
that protecting freedom of speech is, in at least some instances, consistent 
with the positive obligations in Article 4 because both the UDHR,50 and 
ICERD Article 551 protect the freedom of expression. 
Whether consistency with freedom of expression is possible within 
ICERD hinges on the meaning of the “due regard” clause. This Note 
employs a helpful typology developed by Onder Bakircioglu, which 
distinguishes three possible readings of the influence of the due regard 
clause on states’ duties under Article 4.52 Some countries, including the 
United States and the United Kingdom, assert that the due regard clause 
prohibits the adoption of any measure that would limit or impair the 
freedom of expression or any other right guaranteed in UDHR.53 Others, 
 
or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form” and the obligation 
to prohibit public authorities and institutions from promoting or inciting racial discrimination. Id. art. 4. 
 46.  Id. art. 4(a)–(b). 
 47.  Id. art. 4(a). 
 48.  Id. art. 4(b). 
 49.  Id. art 4. 
 50.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 19, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217/(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (protecting, among other rights, the “freedom of opinion and 
expression”) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 51.  ICERD, supra note 10, art. 5(d)(viii) (stating that the right to “freedom of opinion and 
expression” is among the civil rights that States Parties agree to guarantee even as they pursue the 
eradication of racial discrimination under Article 4). 
 52.  Bakircioglu, supra note 43, at 28. 
 53.  Id. On signature the United States filed a reservation declaring that: “The Constitution of the 
United States contains provisions for the protection of individual rights, such as the right of free speech, 
and nothing in the Convention shall be deemed to require or authorize legislative action by the United 
States of America incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution.” 20 GAOR, 20th Sess., 1318th 
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including Canada, Austria, Italy and France, argue that the clause requires 
that a balance be struck between securing the freedom from discrimination 
and protecting the freedom of expression.54 Under a third view, the due 
regard clause has no influence on states parties’ obligations, meaning that 
protecting civil rights is not a valid reason for failing to enact, or diluting, 
the positive measures Article 4 requires.55 
Because it does not accommodate freedom of expression whatsoever, 
a conflict between the freedom of expression and freedom from 
discrimination is inevitable under the third view. And, if discriminatory 
speech is covered by the freedom of expression, the first view is similarly 
unsatisfactory because it effectively nullifies the freedom from 
discrimination. But, simultaneous protection of the two rights is possible, 
as a textual matter, under either the second view or a version of the first 
where discriminatory speech falls outside the scope of freedom of 
expression. Accordingly, accommodating the freedom of expression is 
possible given the text of ICERD Article 4. 
B. ECHR Article 10: The Freedom of Expression 
Article 10 of the ECHR sets forth the right to freedom of expression 
and the permissible limitations on that right. Article 10(1) states that every 
individual has the freedom of expression,56 which includes the freedom “to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”57 Standing 
alone, Article 10(1) is inconsistent with the freedom from discrimination. 
Opinions can, after all, be discriminatory. 
However, the ECHR contains two textual routes to reconciliation with 
the freedom from discrimination. The first is Article 10(2), which qualifies 
the freedom of expression, stating that because its exercise carries with it 
“duties and responsibilities,” it is subject to certain restrictions.58 Those 
restrictions must meet several requirements. Specifically, they must be 
 
mtg., ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1318 (1965); see also NATAN LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE 
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 53 (rev. ed. 2015) (discussing the United 
Kingdom’s position). 
 54.  See Bakircioglu, supra note 43, at 28 (referencing a balancing between the Convention and all 
fundamental freedoms). The critical issue, on this view, is whether any right receives primacy in the 
balancing inquiry. 
 55.  Id. Notably, this view also fails to account for the fact that Article 30 of UDHR does not 
permit the destruction of any right through the exploitation of a limiting clause. 
 56.  ECHR, supra note 10, art. 10(1). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. art 10(2). 
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proscribed by law,59 necessary in a democratic society in order to secure 
one of several enumerated interests,60 and, finally, proportionate to 
achieving the relevant interest.61 
Where it is proscribed by law, the right to live free from 
discrimination could be construed as one of the “rights of others” that 
justify restricting the freedom of expression. The inquiry would then hinge 
on whether prohibiting the hate speech at issue was a necessary and 
proportionate means for pursuing the legitimate interest in protecting 
others’ rights. Because the Court’s jurisprudence illustrates that the 
analysis under Article 10(2) is highly malleable and fact-specific, that 
conclusion is certainly possible. 
Alternately, the Court could employ Article 17. That provision forbids 
employing any of the rights in the Convention in a way that will destroy 
any of the other rights or freedoms it guarantees.62 Where expression rises 
to the level of hate speech Article 17 arguably necessitates that it fall 
outside of the protections for free speech, given that the ECHR guarantees 
the freedom from discrimination. Accordingly, compatibility between the 
freedom of expression protected by Article 10 and the freedom from 
incitement to racial discrimination protected by Article 4 of ICERD is, 
again, possible as a textual matter. 
III. EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION: IN SEARCH OF GLOBAL 
CONVERGENCE 
Having established that the evolutive approach to interpretation 
applies to both treaties and that their texts do not necessarily conflict, this 
Section examines the interpretation of both provisions in practice. Section 
A tracks the interpretation of ICERD Article 4, focusing on the construal of 
the “due regard” provision. Next, Section B examines the interpretation of 
ECHR Article 10 for convergence with the interpretation of ICERD Article 
4 outlined in Section A. Neither analysis purports to be exhaustive; rather, 
each reflects pivotal developments in the interpretation of the relevant 
provision. 
 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Though this requirement is not stated in Article 10(2) the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, 
discussed in Section (III)(B) below, makes clear that the necessity requirement entails a proportionality 
requirement. 
 62.  ECHR, supra note 10, art. 17. 
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A. ICERD Article 4 
ICERD was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 21, 
1965, and entered into force on January 4, 1969.63 Although the need to 
eliminate racial discrimination had already been addressed by both the 
UDHR and the International Convention on Human Rights (“ICHR”), it 
was believed that a more detailed treatment was necessary in light of 
apartheid and the widespread revival of anti-Semitism.64 The ICERD was 
adopted to meet that need.65 
The analysis that follows reveals that the Committee has zigzagged in 
its approach to reconciling Article 4’s ban on hate speech with arguments 
invoking the right to freedom of expression. Prior to 2007, the ICERD 
Committee took an expansive approach to interpreting Article 4. Although 
the Committee made use of balancing language during that period, the 
reasoning in its decisions evidences that it was, in fact, embracing the third 
approach described in Section I. Under that approach, the Committee 
rejected the argument that freedom of expression provides reason to deviate 
from the requirements of Article 4 because it considered a complete ban on 
hate speech to be consistent with the right to freedom of expression. 
Between 2007 and 2010, however, the Committee softened its 
position. Specifically, it began accommodating the freedom of expression 
by giving more latitude to national courts and tightening its standard of 
review. However, in the wake of the Committee’s 2013 decision in T.B.B. 
v. Germany there is little doubt that this trend toward accommodation is 
coming to an end —setting up the possibility of future conflict with the 
freedom of expression. The discussion that follows parses the Committee’s 
categorical decisions and recommendations from its balance-oriented ones, 
clarifying the evolution of the Committee’s jurisprudence. As noted in the 
Introduction, this is the first comprehensive treatment of the ICERD 
Committee’s Article 4 decisions. 
The Committee first provided guidance about the implications of the 
due regard clause in the 1983 report, Positive Measures Designed to 
 
 63.  G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014, 660 
U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan 4, 1969. 
 64.  See id. (“Alarmed by manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some areas of 
the world and by governmental policies based on racial superiority or hatred, such as policies of 
apartheid, segregation or separation. . . .”). 
 65.  Id. The ICERD Committee, the treaty body provided for in ICERD Article 8, is part of its 
enforcement machinery. The Committee examines both interstate and individual communications 
submitted under Article 14, which provides that individuals can lodge complaints claiming a violation 
of their rights under the Convention. The analysis here focuses on Committee decisions under Article 
14 that address Article 4; however, it also draws on general comments, reports and concluding remarks 
issued by the Committee in response to periodic reports submitted by states parties. 
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Eradicate all Incitement to, or Acts of, Racial Discrimination.66 Much of 
that Report seems to endorse the second view of the “due regard” clause, 
which requires that states strike a balance between protecting the freedom 
of speech and the freedom from incitement to racial discrimination.67 The 
Report points, for example, to the clause’s legislative history as evidence 
that it represents a compromise.68 Because the United Kingdom would not 
accept a provision that imposed punishment for “the bare expression of an 
idea or mere incitement,” the original draft of Article 4(a) required 
punishing “all incitement to racial discrimination resulting in or likely to 
cause acts of violence.”69 But the Committee rejected that proposal, opting 
to accommodate both positions by coupling broad language banning the act 
of dissemination with the “due regard” clause.70 
At first blush, this seems inconsistent with the third view discussed in 
Section I, under which states cannot cite protecting the freedom of 
expression as a reason for diluting the positive obligations enumerated in 
Article 4. After all, if balance is critical, it seems intuitive that vouching 
safe the freedom of expression sometimes justifies the modification of 
states’ Article 4 duties. But the Report characterizes the contention that the 
full application of Article 4 will jeopardize the freedom of expression as 
“extreme,”71 taking the position that the enumerated obligations in Article 4 
do not jeopardize the freedom of expression. Indeed, the Report 
emphasizes at length that the “due regard” clause does not dilute states’ 
responsibilities under Article 4(a) and 4(b).72 For example, it contrasts the 
duties imposed under those provisions with the general Article 4 obligation 
“to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all 
incitement to, or acts of, discrimination,” which, it states, follows the 
general trend of vesting states “ample discretion to adopt such measures as 
they may deem appropriate to achieve the objectives of the Convention.”73 
General Recommendation No. 15, issued in 1993, clarified the 
Committee’s position on the relationship between the freedom of 
 
 66.   See generally U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Positive Measures to 
Designed to Eradicate all Incitement to, or Acts of, Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/2, U.N. 
Sales No. E.85.XIV.2 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Report]. 
 67.  For example, the Report characterizes Article 4 as “a compromise” between States that 
wished to protect freedom of speech and those that wished to penalize the mere dissemination of ideas 
based on racial superiority. Id. ¶ 2. 
 68.  Id. ¶¶ 2–4. 
 69.  Id. ¶ 2. 
 70.  Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
 71.  Id. ¶ 225. 
 72.  See id. ¶ 218. 
 73.  Id. ¶ 217. 
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expression and the freedom from discrimination. The Recommendation 
argues for the complete consistency of Article 4 and the freedom of 
expression, illustrating that proposition using other international 
instruments, including the UDHR.74 Article 29, paragraph  2 of the UDHR 
states that limits “determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due 
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others” are 
acceptable restrictions on the freedom of expression.75 The 
Recommendation emphasizes that the obligation not to disseminate racially 
discriminatory ideas is among the most important measures for securing 
others’ rights and freedoms.76 
The ICERD Committee first set out a framework for evaluating 
alleged violations of Article 4 in Oslo v. Norway, which was decided in 
2005.77 Under that framework, the Committee must first discern whether 
the statement at issue falls within any of the categories of “impugned 
speech” in Article 4.78 If so, the Committee determines whether or not the 
statement falls within the ambit of the “due regard” clause.79 If it does, the 
statement is protected by freedom of expression.80  But, if it does not, the 
Committee will find a violation of Article 4.81 
Oslo illustrates that the Committee’s early approach was categorical, 
despite its use of balancing language.82 In Oslo, the Committee deemed the 
anti-Semitic remarks at issue impugned speech,83 but held that they did not 
fall within the due regard clause because of their “exceptionally/manifestly 
offensive character.”84 The Committee emphasized its recognition in 
General Recommendation 15 that “the prohibition of all ideas based upon 
 
 74.  See generally U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 42nd Sess., General 
Recommendation 15, On Article 4 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. A/40/18 (Mar. 17, 1993) [hereinafter 
General Recommendation 15]. 
 75.  UDHR, supra note 50, art. 29(2). 
 76.  General Recommendation 15, supra note 74, ¶ 4. The UDHR illustration is particularly 
significant in light of the fact that ECHR Article 10 contains nearly identical language. The ECHR 
provides that measures “prescribed by law” for the “protection of the reputation or rights of others” are 
among the viable limits on the freedom of speech. ECHR, supra note 10, art. 10(2). It stands to reason, 
given that similarity, that the ICERD Committee would also interpret Article 10(2) as taking the 
position that prohibiting hate speech is consistent with the freedom of expression. 
 77.  Jewish Cmty. of Oslo v. Norway, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
Commc’n No. 30/2003, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/67/D/30/2003 (2005) [hereinafter Oslo]. 
 78.  Id. ¶ 10.4. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. ¶ 10.5. 
 82.  See id. ¶ 2.1. 
 83.  See id. ¶ 10.4. 
 84.  Id. ¶ 10.5. 
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racial superiority or hatred is compatible with the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression.”85 That statement and the complete absence of 
balancing from the analysis suggest that hate speech falls outside of the 
freedom of expression’s scope. But the Committee’s language was unclear. 
The decision also noted that other international bodies have afforded 
freedom of expression less protection in hate speech cases.86 That language 
implies that hate speech is, in some instances, protected expression.87 
However, the lack of interpretive latitude afforded Norway in Oslo is 
consistent with the position that the Committee did not, in fact, employ the 
balancing approach explained in Section I. Norway submitted that the 
Committee should defer to the Norwegian Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sjolie, which held that the same speech at issue in Oslo was protected 
expression, emphasizing that states parties should be afforded deference in 
striking a balance with the freedom of expression.88 The Committee agreed 
that states were owed deference, but responded that it, nonetheless, had 
“the responsibility to ensure the coherence of the interpretation of the 
provisions of [A]rticle 4 of the Convention as reflected in its [General 
Recommendation No. 15].”89 Given the intensity of the Committee’s 
subsequent analysis, it is unclear what latitude, if any, Norway actually 
enjoyed. 
In Gelle v. Denmark the Committee more expansively applied the 
categorical approach to Article 4.90 The statement at issue, by a politician, 
characterized asking Somali organizations what they thought about laws 
banning genital mutilation as akin to asking the “association of 
[p]edophiles” whether they objected to banning child sex.91 The Danish 
Prosecutor did not pursue the case on the grounds that because the 
 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Notably, the puzzling combination of balance-oriented and categorical language in 
Committee decisions predates even the establishment of a clear methodology for interpreting Article 4. 
Quereshi v. Denmark is illustrative. In Quereshi, which was decided in 2003, the Committee drew “the 
attention of the State Party to the need to balance freedom of expression with the requirements of the 
Convention to prevent and eliminate all acts of racial discrimination.” The idea that “balance” is 
consistent with the complete prohibition and eradication of racist statements seems inconsistent with 
any typical meaning of the term. Rather, the Committee seemed to employ a categorical analysis that 
paid lip service to freedom of expression. See Kamal Quereshi v. Denmark, Comm. on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination, Commc’n No. 27/2002, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/63/D/27/2002 (2003). 
 88.  Oslo, supra note 77, ¶ 10.3. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See generally Mohammed Hassan Gelle v. Denmark, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, Commc’n No. 34/2004, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/68/D/34/2004 (2006) [hereinafter Gelle]. 
 91.  Id. ¶ 2.1. 
3. SHOWALTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2016  2:31 PM 
392 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol 26:377 
comment was not necessarily discriminatory92 no criminal act had been 
committed.93 Because there were no issues of fact, the State argued that the 
Prosecutor, in making the relevant decision of law, had carried out his 
Article 4 duty to effectively implement Denmark’s hate speech laws.94 But 
the Committee disagreed, holding that the existence of a non-
discriminatory reading did not dispose of the matter because the comment 
could be understood as degrading an entire group of people on the basis of 
their ethnicity.95 Given that possibility, the Committee reasoned, it was 
inappropriate for the Prosecutor to deem the anti-discrimination law 
inapplicable without further investigation.96 The opinion  clarified that 
decisions not to prosecute based on non-discriminatory interpretations of a 
statement need to be grounded in evidence that the non-discriminatory 
meaning was, indeed, intended.97 
The Committee also rejected the argument that because the statement 
was political speech it was exempt from the application of Article 4.98 The 
Committee clarified that, under General Recommendation 30, the State has 
a particular duty to prevent discriminatory speech by politicians.99 In doing 
so, it foreclosed using political speech as a safe harbor.100 Thus, Gelle made 
clear that the Committee would reject attempts to accommodate free 
expression by limiting the categorical approach’s application. 
In more recent decisions, however, the Committee appeared to change 
course.  For example in Er v. Denmark, decided in 2007, the Committee 
indicated that it would afford more leeway to states attempting to vouch 
safe the freedom of expression by approaching admissibility restrictively.101 
In Er, the applicant claimed both that Danish legislation did not effectively 
protect victims of ethnic discrimination and that Danish Courts did not 
interpret national legislation incorporating Article 4 in accordance with the 
Convention.102 The Committee held that both claims were too abstract, 
 
 92.  See id. ¶ 2.4. The Prosecutor noted that the comment did not refer to Somalis as equal to 
rapists or pedophiles, but “only” took issue with the fact that Somalis were being consulted about the 
criminalization of an act common in their country of origin. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. ¶ 4.4. 
 95.  Id. ¶ 7.4. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. ¶ 7.5. 
 99.  Id. ¶ 7.6. 
 100.  See id. 
 101.  See generally Murat Er v. Denmark, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
Commc’n No. 40/2007, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/71/D/40/2007 (2007). 
 102.  Id. ¶ 3.3. 
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emphasizing that it was the Committee’s task to determine whether there 
was a violation in a particular case, not to assess the general consistency of 
national legislation with the Convention.103 
Second, and more significantly for this inquiry, the Committee 
narrowly construed the admissibility standard. The Committee seized the 
opportunity to emphasize that it could only review the interpretation of 
national law by national courts if the “decisions were manifestly arbitrary 
or otherwise amounted to a denial of justice.”104 The Committee found that 
standard was not met in Er because both the High Court of Copenhagen 
and the High Court of Eastern Denmark had examined the statements in 
light of laws that dealt specifically with discrimination and issued reasoned 
decisions grounded in those laws.105 Thus, the Committee appeared to take 
the position that it could not review a complaint so long as national 
authorities had issued a reasoned decision under laws that dealt, 
specifically, with hate speech. This appeared a significant move toward 
compatibility with the freedom of expression. 
Sinti and Roma v. Germany, decided in 2008, seemed to confirm that 
more permissive trajectory.106 In Sinti the petitioners argued that both the 
existing legal framework in Germany107 and the failure to initiate legal 
proceedings left the Sinti and Roma without protection in violation of 
Article 4.108 The Committee responded by reiterating that its sole task is 
determining whether the application of a particular provision in the case 
before it “was manifestly arbitrary for a denial of justice.”109 It then 
rejected both claims, holding that it could not examine abstract objections 
to the consistency of state laws with the Convention110 and that the decision 
not to prosecute did not satisfy the high admissibility standard.111 
 
 103.  Id. ¶ 7.2. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See generally Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma v. Germany, Comm. on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, Commc’n No. 38/2006, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/72/D/38/2006 (2008) [hereinafter 
Sinti]. 
 107.  Id. ¶ 3. 
 108.  Id. ¶ 2.7. The German Prosecutors had dismissed the case on the grounds that the constitutive 
elements of the relevant offense were not satisfied. Id. ¶ 2.4. The German Supreme Court then rejected 
an appeal on the grounds that the petitioner-associations were affected only indirectly by the 
defendants’ allegedly discriminatory conduct.  Id. ¶ 2.6. 
 109.  Id. ¶ 7.7. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
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The State emphasized that, particularly where national legal standards 
are concerned, discretion in assessing their interpretation is appropriate.112 
Unlike in Oslo, the Committee granted the state meaningful deference and, 
in doing so, made an important observation. The Committee noted that “the 
article in ‘The Criminalist’ has carried consequences for its author, as 
disciplinary measures were taken against him.”113 The Committee thereby 
appeared to endorse a more flexible vision of compliance with Article 4, 
under which states’ decisions of law not to prosecute alleged instances of 
discrimination would be respected, particularly where sanctions besides 
criminal punishment were imposed. 
The softening of the Committee’s position to accommodate freedom 
of speech seemed to continue in the 2009 decision Jama v. Denmark where 
it conducted an “impugned speech” analysis that deviated significantly 
from that in Gelle.114 Jama concerned remarks by a political leader who, 
recalling an attack on her person, stated: “Suddenly they came out in large 
numbers from the Somali clubs . . . I could have been killed . . . [i]t was 
rage for blood.”115 In its assessment the Committee reiterated that Article 4 
implicitly requires the effective implementation of provisions criminalizing 
discrimination by competent national authorities.116 But, it found no 
violation of Article 4 because the statement was not impugned speech.117 
The Committee held that the statement, “despite its ambiguity, cannot 
necessarily be interpreted as expressly claiming that persons of Somali 
origin were responsible for the attack in question.”118 Because the statement 
was not necessarily discriminatory, the Committee held that it could not 
find a violation of Article 4.119 This decision marked a significant departure 
from Gelle, where the Committee found that the existence of an alternate, 
non-discriminatory reading did not end the inquiry.120 Accordingly, it 
seemed that the Committee was expressing a new willingness to safeguard 
expression by adopting non-discriminatory readings where possible. 
 
 112.  Id. ¶ 4.5. 
 113.  Id. ¶ 7.7. 
 114.  See generally Ahmed Farah Jama v. Denmark, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, Commc’n No. 41/2008, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/75/D/41/2008 (2009). 
 115.  Id. ¶ 2.1. 
 116.  Id. ¶ 7.3. 
 117.  Id. ¶ 7.4. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Gelle, supra note 90, ¶ 7.4. 
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However, the Committee appeared to step back toward a more 
restrictive approach in Adan v. Denmark.121 In Adan the Committee 
addressed the approval of Mr. Espersen, another member of the Danish 
People’s Party, of the remark at issue in Gelle.122 As explained in Gelle, the 
remarks with which Mr. Espersen agreed were not necessarily racially 
discriminatory.123 But, as in Gelle, the Committee noted that the statement 
could be understood to violate Article 4.124 Therefore, the Committee held 
that the national authorities’ failure to carry out an “effective investigation” 
into the remarks violated Article 4.125 The decision can be read as an abrupt 
return to the position that investigating the viability of potential non-
discriminatory meanings is necessary. But it should be read as relatively 
insignificant, given that the result was dictated by the Gelle case. 
At a thematic discussion on hate speech, hosted by the ICERD 
Committee in 2012, a number of panelists addressed the problems caused 
by the tension between the freedom of expression and the freedom from 
discrimination.126 Some panelists fully endorsed the ICERD Committee’s 
categorical approach. For example, Mr. Diaconu, the rapporteur of the 
ICERD Committee, approvingly noted the Committee’s repeated emphasis 
that prohibiting hate speech is consistent with the freedom of expression.127 
But other speakers were clearly concerned about the divide between the 
ICERD Committee’s standard and that applied by the ECtHR. 
Mr. Franco, a representative of Amnesty International, explicitly 
encouraged the Committee to adopt a view of the due regard clause 
consistent with other international human rights treaties.128 Specifically, he 
advocated for punishing only intentional racist speech and only insofar as 
necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aim of preventing racial 
discrimination in a particular case—the very analysis applied by the 
ECtHR.129 And Mr. de Gouttes, another member of the ICERD Committee, 
echoed those sentiments. Mr. de Gouttes pointed out that striking “a 
balance between respect for the right to freedom of expression and the 
 
 121.  See generally Saada Mohamad Adan v. Denmark, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, Commc’n No. 43/2008, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/77/D/43/2008 (2010). 
 122.  Id. ¶ 2.1. 
 123.  Id. ¶ 7.5. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. ¶ 7.7. 
 126.  See generally Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 81st Sess., Day of 
Thematic Discussion on Racist Speech, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/SR. 2196 (Sept. 4, 2012). 
 127.  Id. ¶ 30. 
 128.  Id. ¶ 58–64. 
 129.  Id. ¶ 62. 
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provisions of Article 4”130 required “bearing in mind” that restrictions on 
the freedom of expression “were only permissible if they were necessary, 
legitimate and proportionate.”131 
But the Committee’s most recent Article 4 decision T.B.B. v. Germany 
shows that the analysis in Sinti, Er, and Jama did not mark a turning point 
in the Committee’s jurisprudence. It also confirms that the Committee did 
not elect to embrace the necessity and proportionality analysis that several 
participants in the thematic discussion endorsed.132 In T.B.B. the 
Committee considered an interview with the cultural journal Lettre 
International in which Mr. Sarrazin, the interviewee, remarked negatively 
on the lower classes’ productivity and intelligence, focusing specifically on 
migrant workers.133 In its decision the Committee departed from its more 
accommodating precedents by declining to either restrictively apply its 
admissibility standard or credit non-discriminatory readings of the 
statement at issue. 
Germany argued—“referring to the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights”—that deference to the state was appropriate 
because “domestic authorities have the advantage of evaluating the 
facts . . . .”134 And the Committee began its review of the merits by 
reiterating that it could not “review the interpretation of facts and national 
law made by domestic authorities, unless the decisions were manifestly 
arbitrary or a denial of justice.”135 But, in the very next sentence, the 
Committee undercut the thrust of that restrictive standard, stating that, 
regardless, it must assess whether the speech at issue is “impugned” within 
the meaning of Article 4 and whether it is covered by the “due regard” 
clause.136 This  marked a departure from cases including Sinti, where the 
Committee ended its analysis after finding the admissibility standard 
unmet.137 Thus, the Committee neutralized the admissibility standard’s 
potential to accommodate the freedom of speech by declining to make 
admissibility a condition precedent to further inquiry. 
 
 130.  Id. ¶ 43. 
 131.  Id. ¶ 44. 
 132.  See generally TBB-Turkish Union in Berlin/Brandenburg v. Germany, Comm. on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Commc’n No. 48/2010, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/82/D/48/2010 
(2013) [hereinafter T.B.B. Majority]. 
 133.  Id. ¶ 2.1. 
 134.  Id. ¶ 6.2. 
 135.  Id. ¶ 12.5. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  See generally Sinti, supra note 106. 
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Nor did the Committee facilitate consistency with the freedom of 
speech by considering alternative, non-discriminatory readings. The 
majority opinion did not even address the possibility. The dissent argued 
that the majority erred in assuming that Mr. Sarrazin’s statements, which 
could be construed otherwise, violated Article 4.138 Ms. Sarrazin’s 
statements, according to the dissent, may just have easily stood for the non-
discriminatory assertion that cultural factors may contribute to a lack of 
economic success.139 In support of that point the dissenting opinion 
canvassed the work of respected scholars who asserted a link between 
certain groups’ cultural characteristics and their lack of economic 
success.140 The Committee’s refusal to credit those viable non-
discriminatory readings marked a return to the position it adopted in Gelle 
and a radical departure from its decision in Jama. 
And the Committee’s “due regard” analysis in T.B.B. wholly 
embraced the categorical approach to ICERD Article 4. After deciding that 
Mr. Sarrazin’s remarks were “impugned speech” within the meaning of 
Article 4, the Committee determined that Ms. Sarrazin’s statements did not 
qualify for the “due regard” clause’s protection.141 In its perfunctory 
analysis the ICERD Committee emphasized that among the “duties and 
responsibilities” that attach to exercising the freedom of speech is a duty to 
protect the population “from acts of racial discrimination by dissemination 
of ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred.”142 The Committee found 
that the statements at issue disseminated ideas based on racial superiority 
and, therefore, fell outside the scope of the “due regard” clause.143 
The decision did not reflect any effort to “balance” the Article 4 right 
against the freedom of expression. Rather, the Committee stated, without 
further analysis, that “[w]hile acknowledging the importance of the 
freedom of expression, the Committee considers that Mr. Sarrazin’s 
statements amounted to dissemination of ideas based on racial 
superiority . . . .”144  The dissent, on the other hand, clearly advocated for 
embracing the necessity and proportionality analysis employed by the 
ECtHR. In support of the contention that the Committee owed the state 
 
 138.  Individual Opinion of Comm. Member Carlos Vazquez (dissenting), Comm. on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Commc’n No. 48/2010, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/82/3 (2013) 
[hereinafter T.B.B. Dissent]. 
 139.  Id. ¶ 8. 
 140.  Id. ¶ 11. 
 141.  T.B.B. Majority, supra note 132, ¶ 12.8. 
 142.  Id. ¶ 12.7. 
 143.  Id. ¶ 12.8. 
 144.  Id. 
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more deference than was shown, the dissent remarked that “such a policy 
would appear to be required by the principle that any restriction on the right 
to free speech must conform to the strict tests of necessity and 
proportionality.”145 The dissent also highlighted that the majority 
overlooked the drafting history of the “due regard clause,” which was 
introduced to accommodate states who objected to the dissemination clause 
on the ground that it conflicted unacceptably with the freedom of speech.146 
The dissent also went on argue that, even if the statements Mr. 
Sarazzin disseminated contained ideas of racial superiority, it did not 
follow that declining to prosecute violated Article 4.147 That position would 
trample prior statements about the Committee’s respect for the principle of 
expediency and the deference states are owed.148 Instead, the dissent 
argued, states should be able to prosecute only the most serious 
violations.149 The dissent pointed out, specifically, that that position 
appeared “to be required by” the position the ECtHR adopted in Soulas and 
Others v. France.150 The majority did not place a similar emphasis on 
adopting a position that accommodated states’ other international human 
rights obligations, nor did it address the principle of expediency. 
In sum, canvassing the ICERD Committee’s interpretation of Article 4 
reveals that its jurisprudence turned away from and, later, back toward, a 
categorical approach to the relationship between the freedom of expression 
and freedom of speech. Section B, which follows, analyzes the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of Article 10. Section B focuses on the Court’s use of Article 
17, which marked a movement—albeit a temporary one—toward 
consistency with  the ICERD Committee’s interpretation of Article 4. 
B. ECHR Article 10 
In Handyside v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR referred to the freedom 
of expression as “one of the essential foundations of a [democratic] society, 
one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of 
every man.”151 Because this statement identifies the freedom of expression 
as foundational to realizing other human rights, it stands in stark contrast 
with the 1983 ICERD Report, which frames the elimination of racial 
discrimination as a threshold condition for enjoying all other fundamental 
 
 145.  T.B.B. Dissent, supra note 138, ¶ 13. 
 146.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 147.  Id. ¶ 10. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. ¶ 13. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, ¶ 49, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1976). 
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rights, stating that “the eradication of racial discrimination has become a 
peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens).”152 
The Court has not, however, uniformly prioritized the freedom of 
expression over the freedom from discrimination.  In Erbakan v. Turkey, 
for instance, the Court acknowledged that because the equality of all people 
is a foundation of democracy, it “may be considered necessary in certain 
democratic societies to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression 
which spread, incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance.”153 
The Court’s decisions are marked by attempts to parse genuine extremism 
from exercises of the right to freely express views that “shock and disturb” 
others. This Note focuses on cases decided after 2008, when the Court 
began focusing on hate speech and propaganda as opposed to speech 
glorifying violence.154 
Section 1 contextualizes Article 17 by distinguishing cases where it is 
employed “directly” to remove hate speech from Article 10’s 
protections.155 Section 2 then discusses Jersild v. Denmark, which, this 
Note asserts, catalyzed the increased direct application of Article 17. 
Accordingly, the discussion of Jersild herein focuses not on the case, but 
on Denmark’s interaction with the ICERD Committee over the “rights-
clash” it presented. Section A examines the applications of Article 17 that 
preceded Jersild, setting up the contrast with the post-Jersild applications 
of Article 17 discussed in Section B. Section C then discusses the extent to 
which the increased direct application of Article 17 marked movement 
toward consistency with ICERD Article 4 and offers an explanation for the 
absence of convergence. 
1.  Article 17: Hate Speech that Destroys Rights and Freedoms 
Article 17 provides: “Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted 
as implying . . . any right to engage in any activity or perform any act 
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein 
 
 152.  1983 Report, supra note 66, ¶ 232. 
 153.  Erbakan v. Turkey, App. No. 59405/00, ¶ 56, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006). 
 154.  See generally Françoise Tulkens, When to Say Is to Do: Freedom of Expression and Hate 
Speech in the Case-Law of the Court, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 279, 288–95 (Josep Casadevall et al. 
eds., 2012) (distinguishing between hate speech cases, which largely followed 2008, and an earlier 
period during which the Court’s cases primarily involved restrictions on speech glorifying violence). 
 155.  The ECtHR uses two jurisprudential methods to strike a balance between freedom from 
discrimination and freedom of expression in hate speech cases. Under the first, the Court recognizes 
that discriminatory speech is “expression” under Article 10(1), but employs the restrictions in Article 
10(2) to justify its limitation. Under the second, the Court employs Article 17 to categorically exclude 
racist speech from the scope of Article 10(1). David Keane, Attacking Hate Speech Under Article 17 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, 25 NETH. Q.  HUM. RTS. 641, 642–43 (2007). 
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or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the 
Convention.”156 The Court explained in Lawless v. Ireland that Article 17 
prevents individuals or groups from deriving from the Convention a right to 
engage in any activity or perform any act that would destroy any of the 
rights and freedoms the Convention protects.157 The Court has taken two 
distinct approaches to applying Article 17 in hate speech cases.158 This 
Note considers only cases in which Article 17 was applied directly to bar 
the admissibility of an application.159 In such cases, Article 17 is deployed 
to place some expression, categorically, outside of the scope of Article 
10.160 
2. Jersild v Denmark: A Catch Twenty-Two 
In Jersild the applicant, a journalist, made a television documentary 
that contained an interview with a group of young people who called 
themselves the “Green jackets.”161 In the segment, some of the interviewees 
made derogatory comments about immigrants and ethnic groups in 
Denmark.162 The applicant was convicted of aiding and abetting the 
dissemination of those racist remarks and appealed to the ECtHR alleging a 
violation of his Article 10 right to freedom of expression.163 The Court 
found a violation of Article 10 by a thin margin of twelve votes to seven, 
emphasizing that Mr. Jersild only sought to expose, analyze, and explain 
the views of the Green jackets, which were a matter of “great public 
concern.”164 The Court focused on the public right to access, and the 
press’s obligation to disseminate, information at the center of important 
public debates.165 
During the proceedings, Denmark explicitly raised its concern about 
the conflict between the requirements of ECHR Article10 and its 
 
 156.  ECHR, supra note 10, art 17. 
 157.  See Tulkens, supra note 154, at 282–83. 
 158.  See generally Mark E. Villiger, Article 17 ECHR and Freedom of Speech in Strausberg 
Practice, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 154, at 321, 324–29. 
 159.  Id. at 324. 
 160.  Id. Alternatively, the Court sometimes applies Article 17 indirectly as part of the balancing 
test conducted under Article 10(2). Id. at 325. Specifically, the Court considers Article 17 in 
determining whether a given restriction is “necessary in a democratic society.” Id. This Note focuses on 
the direct application of Article 17 because the indirect applications are, essentially, one with the 
traditional Article 10(2) analysis. 
 161.  See generally Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994). 
 162.  Id. ¶ 11. 
 163.  Id. ¶ 14. 
 164.  Id. ¶ 33. 
 165.  Id. ¶ 35. 
3. SHOWALTER(DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2016  2:31 PM 
2016 RESOLVING THE TENSION BETWEEN FREE SPEECH AND HATE SPEECH 401 
obligations under ICERD.166 In Jersild, the State did not argue that Article 
10 was inapplicable. Rather, it contended that the Court’s application of 
Article 10(2) should ensure that Article 10 is not interpreted so as to “limit, 
derogate from, or destroy the right to protection against racial 
discrimination under the U.N. Convention.”167 
Beginning its analysis, the Court emphasized that it was bearing in 
mind the State’s obligations “under the U.N. Convention and other 
international instruments to take effective measures to eliminate all forms 
of racial discrimination.”168 But, in the very next sentence, the Court stated 
that “an important factor in the Court’s evaluation will be whether the item 
in question, when considered as a whole, appeared from an objective point 
of view to have had as its purpose the propagation of racist views and 
ideas.”169 This criteria clearly conflicts with the ICERD Committee’s 
position that considerations of intent should have no part in Article 4 
analysis. 
Although Jersild was the first decision in which the ECtHR directly 
addressed the relationship between states’ obligations under ICERD and 
the ECHR, the Court did not grapple with the substantive issues. After 
stressing that it was not the Court’s place to interpret the “due regard” 
clause, the Court simply observed that “its interpretation of Article 10 of 
the European Convention in the present case is compatible with Denmark’s 
obligations under the U.N. Convention.”170 But, as the analysis above 
illustrates, that statement seems flatly incorrect, particularly in light of the 
Committee’s announcement in General Recommendation 15 that 
completely prohibiting the dissemination of racist statements is consistent 
with the freedom of expression. 
The case against Jersild was a topic of particular interest during 
Denmark’s 1991 periodic report to ICERD.171 Denmark emphasized, when 
questioned by Committee members, that the “Danish Supreme Court 
interpreted the Danish Law 266(b) so as to stress the objective fact of 
dissemination and to exclude consideration of the intent of the 
broadcasters.”172 This position aligned with the Committee’s repeated 
 
 166.  Id. ¶ 27. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. ¶ 31. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. ¶ 30. 
 171.  See generally Ninth Periodic Report of Denmark to the U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/184/Add.2 (Aug. 16, 1989) [hereinafter 9th CERD Report]. 
 172.  Id. 
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pronouncements that Article 4 prohibited the mere act of dissemination.173 
The Report noted that some Committee members “welcomed this decision 
as the clearest statement yet, in any country, that the right to protection 
against racial discrimination took precedence over the right to freedom of 
expression.”174 Though the Report also mentions that some Committee 
members believed a balance with the freedom of expression was 
necessary,175 the development of the Committee’s position outlined above 
seems to evidence that the former members won the day. 
Denmark brought the Jersild decision to the attention of the ICERD 
Committee in its Twelfth Periodic Report, which was published in 1996, 
after the ECtHR found a violation.176 Mr. Jersild was convicted under § 
266(b) of the Danish Penal Code, which codified Denmark’s obligations 
under Article 4. Therefore, Denmark specifically mentioned that “The 
European Court of Human Rights held . . . by 12 votes to 7 that the 
journalist’s right to freedom of expression in accordance with article 10 . . . 
had been violated.”177 And, in reaction to that conviction, Denmark 
clarified that § 226(b) would no longer be applied to “statements which . . . 
otherwise form part of a serious debate.”178 
In its Fourteenth Period Report before the Committee in 2000, 
Denmark explained that in present legal practice under Article 4 the “courts 
assess the consideration of freedom of expression and freedom of the press 
as opposed to the consideration of protection against racist statements.”179 
Thus, as a result of the rights-clash in Jersild, Denmark was on track to 
dilute its obligations under ICERD to the point of de facto nullification. A 
response by the Court was clearly necessary. This Note posits that the 
Court responded using Article 17, directly applying the provision to bring 
its practice in line with the Committee’s interpretation of ICERD.  The 
contrast between the application of Article 17 before and after Jersild, 
which is explored in the following sections, supports that thesis. But, as 
discussed in Section C, that move toward consistency was only temporary. 
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 174.  Id. 
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a. Article 17 Before Jersild 
Both pre-Jersild applications of Article 17 indicate that the provision 
is only relevant in a narrow set of circumstances. Language in both 
decisions seems to cabin the potential efficacy of Article 17 to place anti-
democratic speech outside of the scope of the freedom of expression.180 
This perspective on Article 17 gives Article 10 a wide berth, requiring that 
most speech be subjected to the Article 10(2) balancing inquiry. 
The first such application occurred in the German Communist Party, 
which was issued in 1957.181 There the applicants alleged that the seizure of 
the Communist Party’s assets violated Article 10, among others.182 But the 
Commission emphasized that because the party’s goal was reinstating 
dictatorship, allowing an appeal to Article 10 would undermine the 
Convention’s goal of “safeguarding the free functioning of democratic 
institutions” in violation of Article 17.183 
The second such application of Article 17 came two decades later in 
Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. Netherlands.184 This was the first that dealt 
with hate speech.185 In Glimmerveen, the Commission held that the 
statements at issue, which advocated the removal of all non-white people 
from the Netherlands, fell outside the scope of Article 10.186 The 
Commission reasoned that allowing the protection of such statements 
undermined the overarching values of the Convention.187 Seemingly 
seeking to foreclose any broad construal of the decision, the Commission 
then specified that the “general purpose of Article 17 is preventing 
totalitarian groups from exploiting . . . the principles enunciated by the 
Convention.”188 But although both cases seem to emphasize that hate 
speech unrelated to undemocratic aims does not fall under Article 17,189 
Section B shows that the Court grew more liberal in applying Article 17 to 
place hate speech outside of Article 10’s protections after Jersild.190 
 
 180.  ANNE WEBER, MANUAL ON HATE SPEECH 23–24 (2009). 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Villiger, supra note 158, at 324. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Keane, supra note 155, at 644–43. 
 185.  Id.  
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  See generally Hannes Cannie & Dirk Vorhoof, The Abuse Clause and Freedom of 
Expression, 29 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 54 (2011) (discussing the ECtHR’s increasingly expansive position 
on the Article 17 “abuse clause” in contrast with its narrow origins). 
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b. Article 17 After Jersild 
The possibility of applying Article 17 directly to accommodate 
ICERD’s requirements was foreshadowed in Jersild. Though the youths in 
Jersild were not parties, the Court stated in dicta that their remarks “were 
more than insulting to members of the targeted group and did not enjoy the 
protection of Article 10.”191 Immediately thereafter, the Court cited, to the 
first hate speech case in which Article 17 was applied to bar the 
admissibility of an application.192 Given the uncertainty of characterizing 
Jersild as consistent with ICERD, and the thin margin by which it was 
decided, the mention of Article 17 appears a sort of concession. Having 
emphasized that it would take a strong stand where the freedom of the press 
was at issue, the Court seemed to indicate its willingness to place 
statements and writings by those who advocate racist views outside the 
scope of Article 10— a position more consistent with ICERD. 
Following Jersild, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe issued a Recommendation193 on hate speech that developed just 
such a distinction.194 The Committee recommended that all of the member 
states ratify ICERD immediately after recognizing “the need to reconcile 
the fight against racism and intolerance with the need to protect freedom of 
expression.”195 However, the Committee simultaneously took particular 
note of the need to respect the role of the media in communicating 
controversial information at the center of public debates.196 And, to that 
end, it called on nations to ensure that their laws distinguish between 
journalists reporting on racist statements and the actual authors of those 
statements.197 
But, where lay people were concerned, the Committee made a 
significant concession in the name of preventing hate speech, expressing 
willingness to recognize that, per Article 17, some hate speech falls outside 
of the scope of Article 10.198 Specifically, the Recommendation stated that 
Article 17 should apply directly “where hate speech is aimed at the 
destruction of the rights and freedoms laid down in the Convention or at 
 
 191.  Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890/89, ¶ 35, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1994). 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation 1805 in 
2007, but it deals exclusively with discrimination based on religion. 
 194.  See generally Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (97)20 of the Committee of 
Ministers to Member States on “Hate Speech” (Oct. 30, 1997). 
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their limitation to a greater extent than provided herein.”199 That 
characterization of Article 17’s application was far more expansive than in 
previous decisions. 
The ECtHR first discussed the direct application of Article 17 after 
Jersild in Lehideux v. France, decided in 1998.200 There, the Court elected 
to apply Article 17 indirectly as part of the balancing test conducted under 
Article 10(2). However, it also clarified where Article 17 would apply to 
summarily reject free speech claims at the admissibility stage. While some 
scholars have cited Lehideux for the proposition that Article 17 applies 
directly only in cases involving revisionism and Holocaust denial,201 the 
opinion’s language invites a broader application. For example, the decision 
to apply Article 17 only indirectly appears rooted in the Court’s reasoning 
that because “the advertisement which had given rise to the applicants’ 
conviction did not contain any terms of racial hatred or other statements 
calculated to destroy or restrict the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Convention,” direct application was inappropriate.202 
Such a characterization of Article 17 is manifestly not limited to 
instances of Holocaust denial and revisionism. Judge Jambrek, recognizing 
that fact, wrote a concurrence seemingly committed foreclosing the broader 
direct application of Article 17.203 In his concurring opinion, the Judge 
carefully reframed the discussion of Article 17, emphasizing that its 
application should be cabined by the historical context that gave rise to its 
inclusion—one marked by the firm rejection of totalitarianism.204 Thus, the 
Judge implicitly recognized that the Court’s statement that the facts at issue 
did “not belong to the category of clearly established historical facts— such 
as the Holocaust—whose negation or revision is removed from the 
protection of Article 10” did not cabin the potential applications of Article 
17.205 
Subsequent cases illustrate that the Court did not adopt the reading 
Judge Jambrek proposed and, instead, elected to apply Article 17 more 
broadly.206 The ECtHR first directly applied Article 17 to bar the 
admissibility of an application in Garaudy v. France, which was decided in 
 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  WEBER, supra note 180, at 23–24. 
 201.  See, e.g., Keane, supra note 155, at 647–51. 
 202.  Lehideux v. France, App. No. 24662/94, ¶ 37, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998). 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
 205.  Id. ¶ 47. 
 206.  See generally Cannie & Vorhoof, supra note 190. 
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2003.207 There, Mr. Garaudy, who was convicted of denying crimes against 
humanity, publishing racially defamatory statements and incitement to 
racial hatred, appealed to the Court alleging a violation of his Article 10 
freedom of expression.208 The Court held that the claim was inadmissible 
under Article 17.209 But, notably, the Court’s admissibility discussion did 
not end after it noted that the real purpose of Mr. Garaudy’s book was to 
“rehabilitate the Nationalist-Socialist regime.”210 Instead, the Court went on 
to cite the fact that Mr. Garaudy had endorsed “one of the most serious 
forms of defamation of Jews”—Holocaust denial—as an additional reason 
for invoking Article 17.211 In doing so, the Court characterized Article 17 
more broadly than in Glimmerveen, stating that the acts in question were 
incompatible with the Convention because they infringed the rights of 
others.212 
The Court applied a similarly generous approach to Article 17 in 
Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, a 2007 decision that dealt with ethnic hatred.213 In 
that case, the applicant published articles that identified the entire Jewish 
ethnic group as having plotted against the Russian people and ascribed 
Fascist ideology to Jewish leaders.214 The applicant appealed his conviction 
for public incitement to ethnic hatred, alleging a violation of his rights 
under Article 10.215 But the Court held that the claim was inadmissible 
because such a general attack on the Jewish ethnic group was contrary to 
values at the heart of the Convention and, therefore, violated Article 17.216 
In Leroy v. France, which was decided in 2008, the applicants alleged 
that their conviction for complicity in condoning terrorism violated their 
Article 10 rights.217 The applicant, a cartoonist, had drawn the attack on the 
Twin Towers and included in the caption “We have all dreamt of it . . . 
Hamas did it.”218 But the Court declined to apply Article 17 directly for 
several reasons.219 First, the Court held that the cartoon was not of a kind 
 
 207.  Id. at 61–62 (discussing Garaudy v. France, App. No. 65831/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003)). 
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with the racist remarks in previous cases that negated fundamental rights 
and struck directly against the values underlying the Convention.220 
Second, the Court noted that the drawing was not an unequivocal attempt to 
justify terrorist acts.221 Finally, the Court observed that the offense caused 
the victims had to be examined in light of the freedom of expression.222 
In Feret v. Belgium, which was decided in 2009, the Court again 
declined to apply Article 17 directly.223 There, the applicant, a Member of 
Parliament and chairman of an extreme right-wing party, disseminated 
leaflets containing racist and xenophobic speech.224 He appealed under 
Article 10 after being convicted of public incitement to discrimination and 
racial hatred.225 Though the State argued that Article 17 should apply, and 
the case be declared inadmissible, the Court declined to apply the 
provision.226 
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Paksas v. Lithuania, which 
was decided in 2011.227 In Paksas the Court stated that: “the Article is 
applicable only on an exceptional basis and in extreme circumstances.”228 
The Court also provided an unequivocal characterization of the narrow 
purpose of Article 17, stating that it exists to: “prevent individuals or 
groups with totalitarian aims from exploiting in their own interest the 
principles enunciated in the Convention.”229 
In sum, the foregoing analysis reveals that prior to 2003 Article 17 
was seldom applied and, even then, was only in cases involving threats to 
democratic government. However, following Jersild and the ensuing 
Council of Europe Recommendation, the Court began directly applying 
Article 17 far more frequently and in a wider variety of circumstances. But 
beginning in 2008, the Court decided a series of cases that ran against that 
trend by refusing to place all hate speech within the purview of Article 17. 
Section C, which follows, analyzes the ECtHR’s temporary move toward 
consistency with the ICERD Committee’s interpretation of Article 4 and 
seeks to explain its subsequent abandonment of that compromise. 
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IV. ARTICLE 17: PRODUCING COMPETITION RATHER THAN 
CONVERGENCE 
This sub-section analyzes the decisions of the ICERD Committee and 
ECtHR in conjunction. Given the lack of direct evidence that these bodies 
did, in fact, consider each other’s case law, this sub-section draws 
reasonable inferences from shifts in their respective positions. The analysis 
that follows does not confirm the thesis that a trend toward convergence 
emerges as international courts and treaty bodies interpret rights that 
present the potential for conflict. Instead, it reveals a complex reality 
marked by a noteworthy unintended consequence—a sort of competition 
between the ICERD Committee and the ECtHR. 
The case study does demonstrate the use of interpretation to create 
inter-body consistency. The trajectory of both sets of decisions invites the 
inference that ECtHR’s increasingly broad and frequent applications of 
Article 17 responded to the conflict between ICERD Article 4 and ECHR 
Article 10 Denmark faced in Jersild. But that move toward consistency did 
not begin a march toward convergence. Instead, the case study indicates the 
emergence of a puzzling “competition” between the bodies—a competition 
in tension with the goal of avoiding a “rights-clash” through interpretation. 
This sub-section draws out and explains those two threads of the case 
study. 
As the discussion above illustrates, the ICERD Committee took a 
fairly categorical approach to the application of Article 4 before 2007. The 
Committee’s decisions and recommendations focused heavily on the 1983 
Report’s statement that the complete prohibition of racist speech is 
consistent with the freedom of expression. And the outcomes of the 
Committee’s decisions and thrust of its recommendations during this period 
illustrate that any balancing language that the Committee included was 
little more than an impotent nod to free speech concerns. 
This characterization is supported by the Committee’s refusal to adopt 
other strategies that would have better accommodated the freedom of 
speech. For example, in Oslo the Committee paid mere lip-service to the 
idea of deference to national courts, conducting stringent review of the 
Norwegian Supreme Court’s decision that no violation of the hate speech 
law at issue had occurred.230 And, in Gelle, the Committee rejected both the 
argument that a non-discriminatory reading of alleged hate speech should 
 
 230.  Oslo, supra note 77, ¶ 10.3. 
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be adopted where possible231 and the argument that political speech ought 
to be afforded special protection.232 
It was during this same period that the ECtHR considered and handed 
down its decision in Jersild. As discussed in Section III(B)(2) above, a 
concerned Danish government brought the prosecution to the ICERD 
Committee’s attention in 1991, while the case was still under consideration 
before the ECtHR.233 But Denmark did not receive a unified response about 
how to handle the “rights-clash” between the freedom of expression and 
freedom from discrimination. While some Committee members welcomed 
the prosecution as an appropriate manifestation of Denmark’s treaty 
obligations,234 others cautioned that Denmark ought to take care in striking 
a balance with freedom of expression.235 
Once the ECtHR handed down its decision in Jersild, an 
understandably frustrated Denmark announced that it would not prosecute 
as hate speech any expression related to matters of public concern.236 This 
was seemingly in clear contravention of the ICERD Committee’s position 
that prohibiting all hate speech was consistent with the freedom of 
expression.  But, notwithstanding Denmark’s announcement, the ICERD 
Committee continued to apply a categorical approach in the Quereshi, Oslo 
and Gelle decisions discussed above. 
Denmark’s reaction and the Committee’s refusal to adopt a more 
nuanced approach were problematic for several reasons. First, Denmark’s 
de facto nullification of its obligations under ICERD Article 4 set a 
dangerous precedent for compliance. Second, the fact that Denmark faced 
such a conflict seemed likely to disincentivize other states from ratifying 
both treaties for fear of facing a similar impasse. And, finally, the very fact 
of the conflict between ECHR Article 10 and ICERD Article 4 cut clearly 
against the fundamental notion of the universality of human rights 
discussed in the Introduction. 
In contrast with the relative silence of the ICERD Committee, the 
ECtHR took clear note of the problems that Jersild presented. First, the 
ECtHR noted the ICERD Committee members’ divergent responses to the 
prosecution in the Jersild opinion itself.237 The ECtHR also made explicit 
mention in the opinion of Jersild’s purported consistency with Denmark’s 
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obligations under ICERD.238 The ECtHR was clearly concerned about the 
issues Denmark raised before the ICERD Committee in its 1991 periodic 
report. And given that the Committee was continuing to take a categorical 
approach, seemingly refusing to meaningfully accommodate the freedom of 
expression, the ECtHR was forced to act. 
When faced with a surge of hate speech cases in 2008, the ECtHR 
began employing Article 17.239 The direct application of Article 17 is 
consistent with the approach taken by the ICERD Committee. Where it is 
directly applied, Article 17 completely removes the speech at issue from 
the scope of Article 10’s protections. And that is exactly what the ICERD 
Committee’s decisions circa-2007 appeared to require.240 By positing that 
the freedom of expression and freedom from discrimination were 
completely consistent, the Committee clearly indicated that hate speech 
ought not receive any protection as free expression. This position was at 
odds with the traditional approach under ECHR Article 10(2), which 
presumes that hate speech is covered by the freedom of expression and 
proceeds to selectively disqualify some instances from its protections using 
proportionality balancing.241 
The stark contrast between the early and later applications of Article 
17 creates a reasonable inference that the ECtHR’s re-imagination of the 
provision was an effort at consistency. Before Jersild, Article 17 was 
employed sparingly—indeed, it was only directly applied twice.242 And 
although Article 17 was applied to hate speech in one of those two early 
cases, it was used only where the facts presented speech advocating the 
anti-democratic extermination of a race.243 The ECtHR’s decisions between 
1994 and 2007 removed Article 17 from this narrow context and, instead, 
employed the provision to categorically exclude more generic hate speech 
from the protections of ECHR Article 10 in cases including Garaudy and 
Pavel. This move toward consistency brought the application of ECHR in 
line with ICERD. 
During period that followed—between 2007 and 2010—the ICERD 
Committee began softening its approach, making meaningful room for 
 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  While several scholars, including those cited in Sections III.B.2.A–B have discussed the 
divide between the cases in which Article 17 was applied as part of the Article 10(2) balancing inquiry 
and those in which it was applied to categorically exclude hate speech from the ambit of Article 10, this 
is the first article to explain that shift. 
 240.  See supra Section III.A. 
 241.  ECHR, supra note 10, art 10. 
 242.  See supra Section III.B.2.A. 
 243.  Id. 
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balance in its decisions. Why, exactly, this shift occurred is unclear. But it 
is fair to infer that the Committee responded in kind to the ECtHR’s efforts  
because it recognized that such compromises were necessary to avoid a 
“rights-clash.” The ICERD Committee’s concessions took several forms 
including tightening the admissibility standard244 and expressing 
willingness to credit non-discriminatory interpretations of alleged hate 
speech where possible.245 These parallel developments between the ICERD 
Committee’s jurisprudence and that of the ECtHR evidence movement 
toward consistency in interpretation. But these changes did not mark the 
start of a linear progression toward convergence. Quite the opposite. 
The ICERD Committee’s concessions did not go unanswered by the 
ECtHR. Instead, during this same period, there was a marked decline in the 
frequency with which the ECtHR directly applied Article 17. In a series of 
cases including Leroy and Feret the Court began declining to do so until, in 
Paksas, it explicitly cabined the potential relevance of Article 17 to 
instances of hate speech advocating totalitarianism. Specifically, the 
Paksas decision stated: “the Article is applicable only on an exceptional 
basis and in extreme circumstances.”246 It stands to reason that the Court 
began taking this more stringent approach in light of the concessions made 
by ICERD. Sensing that the danger of a clash was receding in light of the 
changes in the ICERD Committee’s approach, the ECtHR likely saw itself 
as returning its primary focus to maximizing the protection afforded the 
right under its charge—the freedom of expression. 
But, in 2013, the trajectory of the ICERD Committee’s jurisprudence 
shifted. In T.B.B. the Committee reverted to taking a categorical view of 
the relationship between the freedom of expression and the freedom from 
discrimination. The Committee also declined to apply its admissibility 
standard restrictively or to credit non-discriminatory readings of the 
allegedly racist statements at issue. Both of those changes evidenced 
refusal to cabin the reach of the categorical approach. The dissent railed 
against this shift, urging the Committee to continue observing the more 
permissive precedent it had recently established and even stating explicitly 
that the majority’s approach was contrary to recent judgments of the 
ECtHR.247 In light of the evident discord between the T.B.B. and Paksas 
decisions, nations that have ratified both treaties once again find 
themselves facing the same problems that confronted Denmark in Jersild. 
 
 244.  See supra Section III.A. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Paksas v. Lithuania, App. No. 34932/04, ¶ 87, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011). 
 247.  See generally T.B.B. Dissent, supra note 138. 
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While it is unclear why, exactly, the ICERD Committee’s 
jurisprudence took this turn, it is plausible that the Committee was 
responding to the fact that the ECtHR foreclosed the direct application of 
Article 17 to hate speech cases generally. Given the ECtHR’s return to a 
less permissive approach, the Committee may have seen itself as faced with 
the possibility of being forced to bear the entire burden of compromise. 
And, absent the sort of direct conflict that it faced in Jersild, the Committee 
likely perceived more benefit in returning to maximizing the protection of 
the right that it, in particular, was charged with interpreting and 
administering than in continuing to meet the ECtHR halfway. 
This outcome has important implications for universality. As noted in 
the Introduction, the expectation of a trend toward convergence is grounded 
in that fundamental principle. Specifically, in the reasonable assumption 
that courts and treaty bodies’ interpretations will trend toward inter-
instrumental convergence because these bodies view discrete human rights 
as part of a set of properly universal protections. But the outcome of this 
case study undermines that assumption. As noted above, once the ICERD 
Committee began taking a more permissive approach, the ECtHR started 
declining to accommodate the ICERD Committee’s interpretation of 
ICERD Article 4 using ECHR Article 17. And the ICERD Committee then 
returned to taking a categorical position on the relationship between the 
freedom of speech and the freedom of expression. Those parallel 
developments indicate that both bodies approached interpretive 
compromises not as solutions, but as temporary measures.  Rather than 
aiming to maximize protections by ensuring lasting inter-instrumental 
consistency through convergence, each sought to abandon compromise 
once the threat of conflict had “passed” in the interest of “maximizing” the 
protection of the specific right under its charge. 
But, as the case study illustrates, that position was shortsighted. It 
produced competition as both bodies vied to retreat from positions of 
interpretive compromise. And that competition resulted in a 
counterproductive return to the very positions that contributed to the 
conflict in Jersild. Thus, this approach perpetuated the “rights clash.” And, 
as discussed above, such clashes not only discourage compliance, but 
future dual ratification – in short, they are inimical to the universal 
protection of human rights. To halt this cycle, the ICERD Committee and 
ECtHR must come to see interpretive measures aimed at consistency as 
solutions, which, in turn, requires looking beyond the four corners of any 
one instrument to the broader goal of inter-instrumental consistency 
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CONCLUSION 
This analysis demonstrates that the ECtHR did, indeed, move toward 
consistency by using Article 17 to accommodate the interpretation of 
Article 4. But it also demonstrates that this move toward consistency did 
not mark progression toward convergence. Rather, tracking parallel 
developments in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the ICERD 
Committee reveals that the ECtHR employed Article 17 as a temporary 
solution. The return to an impasse in T.B.B. and Paksas illustrates the 
danger in approaching interpretive compromises as necessary evils to be 
abandoned. In the case of related rights that present the potential for a 
rights-clash, it is critical that treaty bodies and courts see convergence as a 
lasting solution. Otherwise, conflicts deleterious to universality will 
continue to present themselves. 
In order to resolve this cycle of discord courts and treaty bodies 
charged with interpreting and administering related international 
instruments ought to take a comprehensive view of what it is to protect 
human rights, eschewing a myopic focus on the rights under their charge. If 
they do so, these institutions will come to see compromises and 
interpretations that avert rights clashes, like that Article 17 represents, as 
pivotal tools for maximizing the protection of human rights. This, in turn, 
will help secure the broadest human rights protections possible by 
removing barriers to widespread treaty ratification and compliance. 
To this end, both the ECtHR and ICERD should employ a 
proportionality balancing analysis when presented with conflicts between 
the freedom of expression and the freedom from incitement to racial 
discrimination.  Typically, a proportionality balancing analysis proceeds in 
three steps.248 First, the court assesses whether a measure that restricts a 
right is designed to further a legitimate aim. Second, the court determines 
whether the measure at issue is necessary to further that legitimate aim. 
And, finally, the court decides whether the measure is a proportionate 
method for furthering the relevant aim. If these three criteria are met, a 
measure that infringes on a protected right will, nonetheless, be upheld. 
Imagine that the ECtHR is confronted with a law that restricts the 
freedom of expression in the name of ensuring the freedom from incitement 
to racial discrimination.249 The ECtHR would, first, determine whether the 
 
 248.  Jonas Christoffersen, Human Rights and Balancing: The Principle of Proportionality, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 19, 19 (Christophe Geiger 
ed., 2015). 
 249.  Although this Conclusion uses hypothetical application of proportionality balancing by the 
ECtHR for purposes of illustration, the ICERD Committee could apply a similar analysis. 
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law was designed to further the legitimate aim of ensuring freedom from 
incitement to racial discrimination.250 In other words, the ECtHR would 
decide if the law bore a rational relationship to the legitimate aim of 
ensuring the freedom from incitement to racial discrimination. True, that 
legitimate aim is not explicitly enumerated in the ECHR; however, the 
ECtHR could locate the freedom from incitement to racial discrimination in 
its existing Article 17 jurisprudence. And it ought to, given that recognizing 
the protection of a conflicting right as a legitimate aim is critical to 
achieving reconciliation. Indeed, the very possibility of a proportionality 
analysis depends on it. 
Second, the ECtHR would assess whether the law ensuring the 
freedom from incitement to racial discrimination unnecessarily impeded 
the freedom of expression.251 Put simply: the ECtHR would decide whether 
the law unnecessarily infringed the freedom of expression. This highly fact-
specific overbreadth inquiry would be conducted on a case-by-case basis. 
Notably, because two human rights are at issue, the traditional “least 
restrictive means”252 standard does not seem appropriate. Applying the 
relatively draconian least restrictive means standard to measures taken to 
prevent speech inciting racial discrimination would effectively privilege the 
freedom of expression over the freedom from incitement to racial 
discrimination. Accordingly, a least restrictive means analysis is in tension 
with the goal of resolving the competition between the ECtHR and ICERD 
discussed above. 
Third, and finally, the ECtHR would look for “fit” between the 
intrusion on the freedom of expression and the resultant benefit to those 
protected from speech inciting racial discrimination.253 This prong of the 
analysis is extremely fact-specific. To determine whether such “fit” exists 
the ECtHR would, first, assess the intensity of the infringement on the 
freedom of expression in the case before it. Second, the ECtHR would 
assess the importance of pursuing the legitimate aim of ensuring freedom 
from racial discrimination in the case before it. Notably, the ECtHR could 
facilitate compromise at this stage of the inquiry by assigning special 
significance to the fact that a measure was enacted to the end of fulfilling a 
nation’s obligations under ICERD. The Court would, ultimately, determine 
whether the importance of pursuing the legitimate aim outweighed the 
severity of the infringement. 
 
 250.  Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional about Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803, 805 
(2004) (discussing the widely adopted Canadian account of proportionality analysis). 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Id. 
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Adopting this proportionality balancing approach would afford a 
margin of appreciation to states implementing potentially conflicting treaty 
obligations. That margin of appreciation is critical. In its absence, states 
would likely shy away from signing and ratifying even potentially 
inconsistent human rights treaties for fear of a Hobson’s choice like that 
Denmark faced in Jersild. That hesitation would, in turn, result in a 
normatively undesirable under protection of human rights in tension with 
the fundamental idea of universality. A proportionality balancing approach 
would prevent that parade of horribles by facilitating the reconciliation of 
competing rights. 
 
